

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 17441 01 OF 02 012020Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00
SS-15 SP-02 NSCE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
L-03 SSM-03 PRS-01 USIE-00 /072 W
-----023231 012038Z /50

O P 011640Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5176
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIROITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIROITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 17441

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: UR US XF
SUBJECT: KHADDAM VISIT TO MOSCOW

REF: MOSCOW 17380

SUMMARY: DURING KHADDAM VISIT SOVIETS SUPPORTED TRIPOLI
CONFERENCE, OPPOSED CAIRO, AND WAFFLED ON A BAGHDAD
MEETING. BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL HOPES FOR
A SUCCESSFUL TRIPOLI MEETING. GROMYKO COMPLAINED THAT
SADAT WAS MOVING TOWARDS A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL,
AND INSISTED THAT THE MEPC WAS THE ONLY FORUM WHERE
THE OPPOSING SDES SHOULD MEET TO ARRANGE A PEACE. END SUMMARY

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 17441 01 OF 02 012020Z

1. SYRIAN DCM EMILE CHOUERI GAVE EMBOFFS READ
OUT OF HIS FOREIGN MINSTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
NOV 29-30. HE SAID VISIT RESULTED FROM AN AGREE-
MENT WITH THE SOVIETS TO CONSULT REGULARLY AND
FOLLOWING ANY EVENTSO F MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SUCH AS THE RECENT SADAT
MOVES. SINCE THE VISIT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL ONE

THERE WAS NO COMMUNIQUE. CHOUERI DESCRIBED THE MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO (TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS) AND WITH BREZHNEV (ONE HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTES) AS CORDIAL AND BUSINESSLIKE WITH BOTH SIDES EXPRESSING THEMSELVES IN A FRANK AND FRIENDLY WAY ON THE ISSUES. THE MAIN POINTS, AS RELATED BY CHOUERI, FOLLOW.

2. SADAT VISIT AND CAIRO MEETING: KHADDAM TOLD HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS THAT SYRIA WAS OPPOSED TO THE SADAT VISIT TO ISRAEL BECAUSE IT WAS A "MAJOR CONCESSION" WITHOUT ANY RECIPROCAL STEP BY THE ISRAELIS. SADAT IN EFFECT RECOGNIZED ISRAEL AND ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF JERUSALEM BY GOING TO THESE PLACES. IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH AND IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GYPTIAN PARLIAMENT ON HIS RETURN SADAT FAILED TO MENTION THE PLO, THUS UNDERCUTTING THE SOLE, LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. THIS FAILURE, KHADDAM SAID, WAS AGGRAVATED BY SADAT'S MENTION OF "OTHER PALESTINEANS" IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY ADDRESS AND BY THE ISSUANCE OF MORE THAN ONE INVITATION TO PALESTINEANS TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE. THE EFFECT OF THIS IS TO CONCEDE THE PLO REPRESENTATION ISSUE TO ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, KHADDAM TOLD THE SOVIETS, SYRIA CONSIDERS THAT SADAT SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT CONTAINED "IMPLICIT ATTACKS" AGAINST ASSAD AND THE PLO (THIS LATTER, CHOUERI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 17441 01 OF 02 012020Z

SAID REFERRED TO THE SADAT REFERENCE TO THOSE WHO SUFFER IN ISRAELI PRISONS AS BEING BETTER THAN THOSE WHO AGITATE OUTSIDE ISRAELI BORDERS).

3. GROMYKO RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THE SADAT VISIT REPRESENTED THE FIRST STEP BY SADAT TOWARD A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL; THE CAIRO CONFERENCE IS THE SECOND. GROMYKO COMPLAINED THAT THESE MOVES MADE THE CONVENING OF THE MEPC MORE COMPLICATED AND THREATENED TO CAUSE IT TO BE POSTPONED. HE ARGUED AGAINST THE CAIRO CONFERENCE SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MEETINGS OF THE OPPOSING SIDES EXCEPT AT GENEVA. THE MEPC COULD NOT BE USED AS A COVER FOR A PEACE ARRIVED AT ELSEWHERE THAN AT GENEVA. HE CITED BEGIN TO THE EFFECT THAT WHEN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE CONVENES IT WILL BE TO CONFIRM A PEACE ALREADY REACHED. THIS GROMYKO INSISTED COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 17441 02 OF 02 011955Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 17441

4. TRIPOLI MEETING: THE SOVIETS PRONOUNCED
THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE TRIPOLI MEETING,
WHICH THEY CONSIDERED WAS MADE NECESSARY BY THE
BAD EFFECTS OF THE SADAT VISIT AND THE CALL FOR
THE CAIRO MEETING. BREZHNEV GAVE A MESSAGE TO
KHADDAM TO TRANSMIT TO THE TRIPOLI MEETING IN WHICH
HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL HOPES THAT THE MEETING
WOULD BE A SUCCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT ALSO BREZHNEV
REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT TO ALL ARABS WHO ARE
STRIVING FOR A "JUST PEACE" IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON
THE BASIS OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF A) WITHDRAWAL
FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; B) RECOGNITION OF
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 17441 02 OF 02 011955Z

THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINEANS C) AGREEMENT THAT
ALL STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD EXIST AND LIVE IN PEACE.

5. ACCORDING TO CHOUERI THE SOVIETS DID NOT AREE WITH THE SYRIANS THAT THE SADAT VISIT AND THE CAIRO MEETING HAVE INEVITABLYPOSTPONED THE MEPC, BUT THEY ADMITTED THAT IT CONVOCATION HAS BECOME MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

6. BAGHDAD MEETING: CHOUERI SAID KHADDAM TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THE IRAQI CALL FOR A MEETING IN BAGHDAD HAS BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE TRIPOLI CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS TOOK THE LINE WITH KHADDAM THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE DIFFERENCES ARISE BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND THE SYRIANS OVER THIS MATTER. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE TRIPOLI MEETING WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME PRONOUNCING THEMSELVES FOR OR AGAINST THE BAGHDAD MEETING.

7. BILATERAL MATTERS: THE SYRIANS HAD LITTLE TIME FOR STRICTLY BILATERALISSUES, BUT THEY DID GET FROM THE SOVIETS A COMMITMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE. CHOUERI WAS NOT INFORMED ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF THE COMMITMENT.
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